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Electronic linkage and interrogation of administrative health, social care 
and criminal justice datasets: feasibility concerning process and content 
 
Abstract 
The objective was to test the feasibility of a novel model of electronic linkage and 
interrogation of large, sensitive, administrative datasets derived from healthcare, social care 
and criminal justice.  Participants comprised all individuals having completed suicide or 
drug-related death in Tayside between 2009 and 2014.  Data were hosted, linked and pseudo-
anonymized by a Trusted Third Party and were interrogated via secure access to the HIC 
Scottish Government-certified Safe Haven.  Several barriers were encountered concerning 
data access, with all but one issue (obtaining criminal justice data) ultimately soluble. 
However, each barrier led to a substantial delay in either obtaining the required approvals or 
in receiving the specified data extracts.  Generally, data coverage was good but data quality 
was poor, with almost a fifth of the data fields (17%) being less than 10% complete.  
Feasibility of this novel approach was demonstrated.  Critically, this was achieved because of 
the central involvement of a Trusted Third Party and the use of a Government-certified Safe 
Haven.  Future studies using a similar model of data acquisition and analysis should consider 
the potential delays resulting from organizations’ lack of familiarity with their data-sharing 
protocols and procedures. 
 








Some important clinical outcomes, for example, suicides and “drug deaths”, cannot be fully 
explained or predicted using only healthcare-derived data and, in consequence, there is an 
urgent need to test whether electronically linked data from partner agencies, for example, 
from social care and criminal justice systems, may improve our understanding and support 
meaningful prediction.  There are recognized barriers to the electronic linkage of health and 
non-health datasets for such purposes.  One of the key issues is the need to obtain approvals 
to hold and to interrogate identifiable data extracts, in order that relevant individuals in any 
study cohort can be identified across different administrative datasets. The key concern and 
risk is that of loss of confidentiality. There is currently no established precedent for the 
release of identifiable extracts of routinely-collected administrative health data in Scotland 
for the purposes of linkage with other public datasets; therefore, there is a need to test novel 
models of electronic linkage that can respond to the data governance requirements of partner 
agencies.  Another significant issue is the use of non-unified, agency-specific individual 
identifiers. Whilst healthcare datasets in the UK contain the NHS Community Health Index 
(CHI) number which permits the linkage of all data to a single individual, other statutory non-
health datasets contain, instead, agency-specific individual identifiers.  This presents a 
challenge when attempting to identify individuals across both health and non-health datasets 
for the purpose of data linkage. 
 
Mindful of these limitations and in the context of the policy imperative towards integration of 
health and social care services in Scotland, both for commissioning and operational delivery, 
there is an urgent need to develop robust methods to develop capacity to exploit routinely-
collected regional and national datasets.  Whilst routinely-collected, administrative, clinical 
datasets tend to be of lower quality and completeness than data collected specifically for 




highly generalisable.  Interrogation of these large, inter-agency, highly generalisable datasets 
could lead to the development of more robust predictive models of disease risk.  The novel 
aspect of the present study was to examine the barriers and potential solutions to setting up 
this type of linked data repository where no specific provision currently exists. 
 
Objectives 
The core objective of the present study was to test the feasibility of a novel model of 
electronic linkage and interrogation of large, pseudo-anonymized, sensitive datasets – from 
the related agencies responsible for healthcare, social care and criminal justice services – with 
the eventual aim of identifying 12-month risk factors for death by suicide. 
 
The core elements of the study design were to bring together available data for those 
individuals who had died between 01.01.2009 and 31.12.2014 and where the official recorded 
cause of death matched specific inclusion criteria as per below. Further, the deceased were 
required to be resident in Tayside area at the time of death.  Health Informatics Centre (HIC) 
Services were asked to generate “controls” to match the key characteristics of the deceased 
“cases”. This required that HIC Services use their population level data to identify individual 
Tayside residents who matched the deceased with respect to gender, age and estimated 
socioeconomic status [as indicated by Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation (SIMD); 
https://www2.gov.scot/Resource/0050/00504809.pdf].  For each “case”, four “controls” were 
generated. The controls were required to be alive at the date of death of their matched cases. 
 
In order to be able to address specific questions relevant to suicide deaths and drug deaths 
separately, three target cohorts were defined.  The first was “probable suicide”, using ICD-10 




Division (ISD). The second cohort was “probable drug deaths”, using ICD-10 codes based 
on the Scottish Government and ISD’s “baseline” definition of drug-related death.  The 
relevant ICD-10 codes for each of these target cohorts are described in Appendix I.  The third 
cohort was an additional set of ICD-10 codes, recommended by the Manitoba Centre for 
Health Policy (MCHP, 2014); the aim was to use this cohort both as a comparator cohort to 
the first cohort (in addition to a matched controls comparator cohort) and to amalgamate with 
the first cohort to provide a more inclusive definition of “probable suicide”.  
 
In the following sections we will describe the process of undertaking this electronic linkage 
study and address the barriers – and potential solutions – to achieving linkage and 
interrogation of these datasets. 
 
Methods 
Legislation governing the use of administrative datasets 
Routinely collected health and social care data are protected by legislation that falls into two 
categories: primary legislation (Acts of the Scottish Parliament); and secondary legislation 
(detailed regulations issued by means of Scottish Statutory Instruments as directed by 
primary legislation).  The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and Data Protection 
Act 2018 are the current laws ensuring data protection in the UK.  Furthermore, the Human 
Rights Act 1998 incorporates into UK law rights and freedoms guaranteed by the European 
Convention on Human Rights.  This legislation has an impact on which records can be 
created, retained and accessed, and it is relevant to those wishing to access identifiable 
information.  However, since the present study used only pseudo-anonymized data, current 





Data protection: identification of a Trusted Third Party responsible for hosting and 
pseudo-anonymizing data 
The Health Informatics Centre (HIC; https://www.dundee.ac.uk/hic/hicservices/), University 
of Dundee, was the facility that was commissioned to host all data required for the present 
study.  HIC provides one of the available Scottish Government-certified Safe Havens and, as 
such, is acknowledged as a Trusted Third Party (TTP) in health informatics.  HIC is governed 
by rigorous Standard Operating Procedures (HIC SOPs; 
https://www.dundee.ac.uk/hic/datasecurityconfidentiality/standardoperatingprocedures/) and 
is subject to annual independent audits 
(https://www.dundee.ac.uk/hic/datasecurityconfidentiality/).  HIC holds generic ethical 
approval, which covers all work involving their data, awarded by the East of Scotland 
Research Ethics Committee (EoSREC; 
https://www.nhstayside.scot.nhs.uk/YourHealthBoard/TheBoardanditsCommittees/EastofSco
tlandResearchEthicsService/index.htm).  This approval is subject to annual independent 
review and is overseen by the HIC Governance Committee. 
 
HIC holds a comprehensive collection of electronic health registers on all individuals in 
Tayside who are registered with a primary care general medical practice (>99% of the 
population).  HIC receives regular regional data extracts from national health registries held 
by Information Services Division (ISD), NHS Scotland, providing a complete record of all 
healthcare contacts for all patients.  Data are available for the past 9-25 years, depending on 
data source, and span such areas as: community-dispensed prescribing; inpatient and 
outpatient treatment episodes and laboratory results.  Data from different NHS healthcare 
services can be linked electronically since all NHS datasets are indexed by the Community 




researchers, all data are pseudo-anonymized – CHI numbers are replaced with proxy CHI 
(proCHI) numbers, which are arbitrary alpha-numeric strings; meaningless outside of the HIC 
environment.  Whilst researchers access data that has been fully anonymized, the overall 
process involved, whereby HIC holds both the data and the index information, results in 
pseudo-anonymization. 
 
Data are accessed exclusively by approved and information security-trained researchers via a 
remote virtual desktop (Citrix XenDesktop, Santa Clara, CA).  Interrogation of datasets is 
undertaken entirely within the HIC Safe Haven using pre-installed software.  Analysis results 
can be exported following review by dedicated HIC personnel; however, no information can 
be copied directly from the virtual desktop to local desktops or portable storage devices. 
 
Data sources 
In addition to utilizing HIC-hosted datasets, the present study aimed to acquire regional data 
extracts from nationally and locally-held, sensitive datasets that were each subject to bespoke 
governance standards.  Data were sought to cover the 12-month period preceding the index 
date for every individual included in the study.  All data sources used in the present study are 
described below. 
 
Scottish Suicide Information database (ScotSID) 
ScotSID is a register held by ISD that acts as a central repository for information (from a 
variety of sources) on all probable suicides in Scotland.  ScotSID was initiated in 2009 and 
provides information such as date of death, cause of death, demographic information and 






National Drug-Related Deaths Database (NDRDD) 
NDRDD is a register held by ISD that acts as a central repository for information (from a 
variety of sources) on all drug-related deaths in Scotland.  NDRDD was initiated in 2009 and 
provides information such as details of death, demographics, known substance misuse, 
previous overdose and previous healthcare contacts.  Further information can be found at 
https://www.ndc.scot.nhs.uk/National-Datasets/data.asp?SubID=26. 
 
Tayside Drug-Related Deaths Database (TDRDD) 
TDRDD is governed by NHS Tayside’s Public Health Directorate which acts on advice from 
the Tayside Drug Death Review Group (TDDRG), a collaboration of professionals 
representing the areas of health care, social care, criminal justice, the Third Sector and the 
three Tayside Alcohol and Drug Partnerships (ADPs).  TDRDD is similar to NDRDD in 
terms of content and, therefore, contains data items concerning the cause of death and the 
personal and clinical characteristics of all cases included on the register. 
 
National Records of Scotland: death certification (NRS Death) 
This dataset is governed by the National Records of Scotland (NRS), a department of Scottish 
Government, and it contains data on all persons whose death was registered in Scotland.  For 
each entry on this register the date and cause of death are recorded.  Cause of death is 
recorded as one or more ICD code(s).  Further information can be found at 
https://www.ndc.scot.nhs.uk/National-Datasets/data.asp?SubID=13. 
 




The Scottish Morbidity Registers (SMRs) are managed by Information Services Division 
(ISD) and governed by National Services Scotland (NSS), NHS Scotland.  SMR01 provides a 
complete record of all acute general inpatient events and SMR04 provides a complete record 
of all psychiatric inpatient events.  For example, both registers include data concerning 
admission reason and status, length of stay, treatment administered and disposal (including 
internal transfers to different specialties).  Further information can be found at 
https://www.ndc.scot.nhs.uk/National-Datasets/data.asp?SubID=5 for the SMR01 and at 
https://www.ndc.scot.nhs.uk/National-Datasets/data.asp?SubID=7 for the SMR04. 
 
Scottish Morbidity Register: outpatient treatment (SMR00) 
SMR00 contains a record of all NHS outpatient clinic appointments: specialty of attendance; 
date of appointment; and attendance category of patient (which enables the calculation of 
“did not attend” (DNA) rates).  Further information can be found at 
https://www.ndc.scot.nhs.uk/National-Datasets/data.asp?SubID=4. 
 
Scottish Morbidity Register: cancer treatment (SMR06) 
SMR06 provides a register of all patients in Scotland diagnosed with malignant disease.  This 
register includes information on the clinical status of the disease, treatment administered and 
whether or not patients have received a terminal diagnosis.  Further information can be found 
at https://www.ndc.scot.nhs.uk/National-Datasets/data.asp?SubID=8. 
 
Scottish Morbidity Register: substance misuse (SMR25) 
SMR25, also known as the Scottish Drug Misuse Database (SDMD), provides a register of all 
patients in Scotland who are in treatment for drug dependence or drug abuse.  The majority 




dependence; however, many have problems with multiple substance misuse.  The register 
contains information concerning personal and domestic circumstances (including 
employment status and living circumstances), substance misuse (name of drug, amount 
consumed, frequency of consumption and route of administration) and medical treatments 
administered.  Further information can be found at https://www.ndc.scot.nhs.uk/National-
Datasets/data.asp?SubID=1. 
 
Scottish Morbidity Register: maternity (SMR02) 
An SMR02 record is opened every time a woman receives inpatient treatment for an 
obstetrics event during the perinatal period.  This dataset comprises a range of possible data: 
diagnostic information; previous pregnancies; fetal terminations; proposals for delivery 
procedure; record of labor; baby record; and known drug and alcohol misuse.  Further 
information can be found at https://www.ndc.scot.nhs.uk/National-
Datasets/data.asp?SubID=6. 
 
Scottish Birth Record (SBR) 
SBR, formerly SMR11, is managed by ISD and governed by NSS, and it provides a record of 
all live and still births in addition to antenatal and post-birth events.  SBR covers the first year 
post-birth, and individual case records contain up to 400 data items including gestation, birth 







This dataset is managed by NHS24 and contains a record of all patient contacts with the 
service.  Data items include: nature of call; advised course of action; ambulance dispatched; 
police dispatched; and involvement of psychiatric services. 
 
Scottish Ambulance Service (SAS) dataset 
This dataset is managed by SAS and provides a record of all patient contacts with the service.  
SAS records several data items: scores on the Glasgow Coma Scale; if patients are under the 
influence of drugs and/or alcohol; known history of substance misuse; police attendance 
required; known prescription medication; and administration of antagonist medication to treat 
overdose (naloxone to treat an opioid overdose or flumazenil to treat a benzodiazepine 
overdose). 
 
Accident and Emergency (A&E) Datamart 
A&E data are managed by ISD and governed by NSS, and the data items include information 
on presenting complaint, clinical status on presentation (including evidence of drug or 
alcohol misuse), treatments administered and disposal (including outpatient referrals).  
Further information can be found at https://www.ndc.scot.nhs.uk/National-
Datasets/data.asp?SubID=3. 
 
Prescribing Information System (PIS): community-dispensed prescribing 
PIS is managed by ISD and governed by NSS, and it contains a record of all community-
dispensed prescriptions.  Data include: prescriber and dispenser details; name, strength and 
formulation of medication; directions for use; and British National Formulary (BNF) 






NHS Tayside laboratories dataset 
These data are owned by NHS Tayside and data governance lies with NHS Tayside’s 
Caldicott Guardian.  Collectively, this dataset comprises information from several 
laboratories: biochemistry; hematology; immunology; microbiology; and virology.  
Composite extracts provided information concerning the date, nature and result of each test. 
 
Project-specific datasets held within the HIC environment 
The Vascular Laboratory dataset provides the results of vascular CARSCAN and SEGPRES 
for all patients in Tayside dating back to 2000 and the results of vascular Duplex Doppler for 
all patients in Tayside dating back to 2008.  The ECHO cardiogram dataset was incepted in 
1994 and contains the results of all echocardiographic examinations for patients in Tayside.  
The Renal Register contains a record of all dialysis and transplant patients in Tayside dating 
back to 2002.  The Scottish Care Information - Diabetes Collaboration (SCI-Diabetes) dataset 
contains a record of all patients with diabetes who were recruited to this study.  Data are 
available dating back to 1996.  The Tayside Allergy & Respiratory Disease Information 
System (TARDIS) contains a record of all patients with either chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease (COPD) or lung cancer who were recruited to this study.  Data are available dating 
back to 2001.  Further information on these datasets can be found at 
https://www.dundee.ac.uk/hic/datalinkageservice/datasetinventory/#!faq-0. 
 
Local Authority datasets: Social Work Departments 
Local government in Scotland is comprised of 32 local authorities, designated as “councils” 
in accordance with the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1994.  The three Social Work 




Tayside: Angus Council; Dundee City Council; and Perth & Kinross Council.  All clients 
undergo at least one Needs Assessment; details of these interviews are recorded along with 
referrals to internal teams and external agencies.  Internal teams maintain an ongoing record 
of assessments, interventions and outcomes for all clients referred to them following the 
initial Needs Assessment.  Internal teams focus on the areas of: community care; child 
protection; and criminal justice. 
 
Local Authority datasets: Finance Departments 
These three datasets are managed by the three respective Local Authorities within NHS 
Tayside; however, some of the data items are governed jointly with the Department of Work 
and Pensions (DWP).  The data contained within these datasets focuses on benefit entitlement 
and level of benefit awarded. 
 
Data held by Police Scotland 
These data are governed by Police Scotland and cover an extensive range of data items 
spanning criminal activity (relating to perpetrators, victims and witnesses), known 
associations, known health and substance misuse issues, detention pending court appearance 




This section begins by examining “process” issues (i.e. obtaining approvals and data extracts) 
and concludes with an examination of “content” issues (i.e. data quality and data coverage). 
 




Due to the extensive range, obtaining data extracts was associated with a complex set of 
required approvals.  Prior to study initiation, approval was sought and obtained from NHS 
Tayside’s Research & Development Department.  An application for ethical approval was not 
required since HIC holds generic ethical approval for all work undertaken within their 
service; however, a Favorable Ethical Opinion was sought and obtained from the East of 
Scotland Research Ethics Committee (EoSREC).  The requirement for additional approvals is 
shown in Table 1, and the nature of these approvals is described further, below. 
 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
 
PBPP approval 
Datasets that are considered to contain sensitive information required approval from the 
Public Benefit and Privacy Panel for Health and Social Care (PBPP).  PBPP is the 
governance structure of NHS Scotland that has responsibility for governance-related matters 
and acts on behalf of NHSScotland Chief Executive Officers and the Registrar General. 
 
The key issue that arose from the application was concern around the inclusion of personal 
identifiers in these sensitive datasets, data that would then be used to identify the relevant 
extracts from all other datasets.  Concern fell around the proposed method of making case 
identifiers known to other host agencies.  This was a requirement of the present study, since 
the aim was to link data for individuals across multiple datasets.  A resolution was achieved 
that satisfied all partner agencies – extracts were obtained from all agencies for all events 
during the specified timeframe, and HIC undertook the final extraction (of appropriate cases 




aware of the “probable suicide” and “drug-related death” classifications of individuals’ 
deaths. 
 
Whilst there were no other particular issues associated with the application, the process took 
considerably longer than was anticipated.  Initial contact was made on 27/10/14 and formal 
approval was received on 25/04/16.  HIC received the ScotSID extract on 12/09/16 and data 
were made available to the research team on 07/10/16.  HIC received the NDRDD extract on 
15/12/16 and data were made available to the research team on 22/12/16.  Subsequent to 
submitting the application, the research team made the decision to withdraw SAS from the 
battery of requested datasets.  This decision was based on poor data quality, and it is 
described later in this section.   In June 2015 the PBPP disclosed that they would be unable to 
provide an extract of the NHS24 dataset for the required period of time and advised that the 
only recourse would be to arrange to receive a direct data feed from NHS24.  An overview of 
the time scale relating to PBPP approval, and subsequent data acquisition, is shown in Figure 
1. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
 
Information Sharing Protocols (ISPs) 
Initial contact was made with NHS24 in June 2015, and the NHS24 Executive Committee 
formally approved the data request on 27/09/16; however, the data extract was not received 
prior to the conclusion of the project. 
 
The Scottish Ambulance Service (SAS) stipulated that, in addition to PBPP approval, an 




this dataset request should be removed from the PBPP application.  This decision was based 
on poor data quality.  SAS reported that only 37.7% of their patients were associated with an 
NHS CHI number during the observation period (i.e. were individuals that could be 
identified).  Following further discussion, it transpired that those who were unconscious or 
incoherent were least likely to be identifiable in the SAS dataset.  Since data concerning these 
individuals could not be considered to be missing at random (MaR), the SAS dataset was 
removed from the required list of extracts. 
 
The Tayside Outpatient Appointments System (TOPAS) is managed by a non-proprietary 
agency (Cambric); therefore, an ISP was negotiated with Cambric acting on behalf of NHS 
Tayside.  The appropriate protocols and procedures were identified rapidly; however, the 
non-proprietary administrative costs rendered this extract cost-prohibitive. 
 
The Scottish Institute for Policing Research (SIPR) was engaged at the outset of the project to 
ensure familiarization with governance protocols and procedures.  SIPR was established in 
2007 following investment from both the Scottish Funding Council and the Association of 
Chief Police Officers in Scotland.  It represents collaboration between Police Scotland and 14 
Scottish universities and takes responsibility for initial review and consultation regarding 
proposed research studies involving data held by Police Scotland.  Following approval from 
SIPR, initial contact was made with Police Scotland on 01/09/14 and interim formal approval 
was awarded on 16/10/15 by Strategic Planning Development, pending the establishment of a 
satisfactory Police Scotland Minute of Agreement (MOA).  Police Scotland presented the 
proposed MOA to SIPR for review and consultation.  In the meantime, in order to avoid 
further delays, Police Scotland examined the terms of the project’s EoSREC approval to 




(i.e. the pragmatics associated with data transfer).  Following internal discussions, however, 
between SIPR and Police Scotland, concerning the MOA, formal approval was repealed in 
November 2016.  The project was informed that the proposed pseudo-anonymization by the 
TTP was unsatisfactory and, in order to proceed, a method of true anonymization was 
required.  In the final month of the project, the research team began working with Police 
Scotland on a new method of information handling; however, it was clear that this would not 
be achieved prior to the conclusion of the study, and that the identification of a satisfactory 
method could only be applied in future studies. 
 
Obtaining an extract of the Tayside Drug-Related Death Database (TDRDD) was 
problematic, largely due to a lack of established access protocols and procedures.  Whilst 
NHS Tayside’s Public Health Directorate acts as the gatekeeper for this dataset, they 
stipulated that Tayside Drug Death Working Group (TDDWG) approval was required in 
order to proceed with the application.  TDDWG involvement resulted in lengthy delays in 
obtaining access to the required data.  One further issue resulted from the decision that 
presence on the TDRDD could be indicated; however, no other data fields would be made 
available to the project.  This meant that individuals from the TDRDD had no additional data 
from that dataset (e.g. toxicology findings, previous overdoses, access to take home naloxone 
(THN) socioeconomic information and personal characteristics, etc.) and, therefore had to be 
excluded from some analyses. 
 
Initial contact was made with the three Local Authority Social Work Departments in August 
2014.  Angus Council Social Work Department (ACSWD) seemed unclear about protocols 
relating to data sharing and, in consequence, meetings were required with numerous staff 




assistance of a former colleague who was able to help in facilitating contact with senior staff 
within ACSWD.  The ISP was signed on 9 December 2016; however, no data extract was 
received prior to the conclusion of the study.  Contacts within Dundee City Council Social 
Work Department (DCCSWD) were aware of protocols and procedures for sharing their data.  
Formal sign-off was obtained in August 2015 and the DCCSWD indicated that the transfer 
could be made at any point thereafter, on our request.  This data extract was dependent upon 
having first identified the cohort; therefore, due to delays in obtaining the core datasets, this 
extract from DCCSWD was finally transferred in January 2017.  Perth & Kinross Council 
Social Work Department (PKCSWD) seemed unclear about protocols relating to data 
sharing; however, staff expressed engagement with the aims of the study and a desire to 
contribute.  A responsible officer was identified on 26/11/15; however, this individual did not 
respond to any further correspondence.  Instead the officer sent approval, prompted by senior 
colleagues, to a colleague outside of the research team who informed us of this in December 
2017.  The extract was transferred to the TTP in January 2017. 
 
Initial contact was made with the three Local Authority Council Tax & Benefits Departments 
(LACTBs) in December 2015.  Representatives from the three LACTBs reached the decision 
to work together with the research team.  This approach seemed to have eased the process 
and encouraged LACTB engagement with the aims of the project.  There were, however, 
some issues concerning access to certain data variables.  This was a result of joint gatekeeper 
responsibilities between the LACTBs and the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP).  
Having no experience of the index system that we proposed to use in incorporating non-CHI 
linked data, the LACTBs were required to undertake internal consultations prior to agreeing 





Initial contact was made with the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) in August 2014.  
Several attempts were made to engage the DWP with the core aims of the study; however, 
this was not achieved.  On each occasion, a message was received informing the study team 
that the DWP would identify an appropriate member of staff, and that that person would 
make contact with a member of the study team. 
 
During the initial months following study inception, discussions were undertaken regarding 
the potential to obtain diagnostic information from Primary Care datasets.  We were informed 
that the data may not be reliable; however, the greatest issue was that each GP practice acts as 
its own gatekeeper.  This meant the need to construct ISPs with each of the 62 individual 
practices in Tayside, assuming consent to participate was given.  Whilst seeking this level of 
consent would be resource-intensive, the greater problem was the projected consent figures.  
This led to concerns in the project team that the inclusion of (consented only) GP practice 
data could skew the findings.  In light of the required resources and the potential to skew 
finding, the decision was taken not to include Primary Care data in the present study. 
 
NHS Tayside Caldicott Guardian approvals 
An NHS Caldicott Guardian is a senior officer who holds responsibility for protecting the 
confidentiality of individuals’ health data.  Each health board within Scotland has a Caldicott 
Guardian who is responsible for data collected within that health board area, and there is an 
NHS Scotland Caldicott guardian who is responsible for national data.  The present study 
utilized data from NHS Tayside and, in consequence, sought NHS Tayside Caldicott 
approval.  NHS Caldicott Guardians are governed by the seven Caldicott Principles, which 






Obtaining Caldicott approval was relatively straightforward, and it was obtained for: the 
HIC-hosted extracts; TOPAS; SMR25; and TDRDD.  The HIC-hosted datasets were made 
available as required.  As discussed previously, TOPAS non-proprietary administrative costs 
rendered this extract cost-prohibitive.  Caldicott approval for TDRDD was non-problematic, 
but the requirement for an independent ISP led to substantial delays, as discussed previously.  
Finally, formal Caldicott approval was obtained for the Scottish Morbidity Register on 
substance use disorders (SMR25); however, due to upload issues between the Tayside 
Substance Misuse Service and ISD, this extract was never delivered to the TTP. 
 
Gatekeeper approvals 
The project-specific datasets held by HIC Services required approval from individual data 
gatekeepers – usually the study’s Principal Investigator (PI).  In each case this was achieved 
by email correspondence, which was adequate approval to facilitate the release of these 
datasets, within the Safe Haven environment, to the present study team. 
 
Process: data integration within the TTP Safe Haven 
An overview of the flow of data into the TTP Safe Haven is shown in Figure 2. 
 
[Insert figure 2 around here] 
 
Obtaining extracts of the core datasets 
The core datasets (i.e. those used to identify cases in the study) were uploaded to HIC 
Services using the host agency’s preferred means of secure data transfer.  No problems were 





Obtaining NHS dataset extracts 
An extract (based on the dates of the observation period) from each of the NHS datasets (i.e. 
those containing CHI number identifiers) was uploaded to HIC Services.  These extracts 
contained data for all individuals from within the specified timeframe.  Within the HIC 
environment, data were extracted for all cases (based on the identifiers contained within the 
core datasets) and controls (selected from the general population by HIC Services), and the 
remainder of each dataset was destroyed. 
 
Obtaining data from non-CHI-indexed sources 
Prior to the inflow of data from non-CHI-indexed sources, a novel indexing procedure was 
used to facilitate the secure transfer of a minimum dataset in each case.  The testing phase 
was successful in all cases.  With Police Scotland having withdrawn from the study, this was 
applied to the three Local Authority Social Work Departments and the three Local Authority 
Council Tax & Benefits Departments.  The indexing procedure is shown in Figure 3. 
 
[Insert figure 3 around here] 
 
Figure 3 shows that non-CHI-indexed datasets, were indexed (with the index key of CHI 
numbers and pseudo-identifiers held by HIC Services).  In practice, this meant that each 
external dataset contained a new variable: the pseudo-identifier, an arbitrary alpha-numeric 
string which was meaningless outside of the HIC environment.  Within HIC Services, the 
case and control CHI numbers were then compared with the key and relevant individuals 
were selected (using the pseudo-identifiers, rather than the host agency identification 




HIC personnel, who then extracted the relevant data from each of the host agency dataset and 
transferred the extract securely to HIC Services, without leaving a footprint on the host 
dataset of records accessed. None of the extracts from non-CHI-indexed datasets was 
received prior to the conclusion of the study; however, two extracts were received during the 
following months.  No problems were encountered and feasibility was demonstrated. 
 
Process: electronic linkage within the HIC environment 
As described above, the ‘core datasets’ were those that were used to identify cases in the 
study (i.e. individuals that completed suicide during the observation period), and matched 
controls were identified by HIC using their ‘CHI Register’, which also contains demographic 
information for all individuals with an NHS CHI number, thus facilitating the matching 
process.  Since regional extracts of all of the required NHS datasets are routinely hosted by 
HIC and updated on a regular basis, the NHS CHI number was used to extract information 
from these datasets for all relevant cases and controls within the HIC environment.  
Thereafter, data were pseudo-anonymized prior to release to the research team.  This process 
involved constructing a key which enabled the replacement of the NHS CHI number with a 
random alpha-numeric string, meaningless outside of the HIC environment.  The data were 
pseudo-anonymized using this key, rather than fully-anonymized, to facilitate further linkage 
by the research team within the Safe Haven, as described in the following section.  As 
described previously, the (non-CHI-indexed) Local Authority data extracts were transferred 
to HIC in a pre-pseudo-anonymized form.  Linkage was relatively unproblematic and it was 
found that all pseudo-identifiers were assigned appropriately.  The principal issue 
encountered at this stage was that, in some, but not all cases, data had been extracted by HIC 
Services for dates that fell beyond those specified.  For example, diagnoses of diabetes 




only the observation period.  In some cases, therefore, inappropriate data were deleted from 
datasets. 
 
Process: data preparation and electronic linkage within the Safe Haven 
All data extracts relevant to the presented study were uploaded, within the HIC environment, 
to the HIC Safe Haven, where all data preparation and interrogation took place.  Datasets 
were presented in the form of comma separated values (CSV) files, ready to be imported to 
any statistical software.  Data were prepared and analyzed by the research team within the 
HIC Safe Haven virtual environment.  The Safe Haven is accessed via a secure web link 
(which requires a Citrix plugin for activation), and a password-protected login is required to 
access study data. 
 
First, each dataset was cleaned and coded.  Very few of the 830 data variables in the datasets 
were coded appropriately for statistical analysis and every variable had cells containing null 
values.  In consequence of this, data cleaning and coding took substantially longer than 
anticipated. 
 
Second, data were transformed.  This largely involved the transformation of datasets from 
long- to wide-form.  In long format each line in the dataset represents an event; however, in 
wide format each line represents an individual.  This process required additional coding; 
however, no problems were encountered during the data transformations. 
 
Third, data were linked across datasets.  This was achieved as a result of the process of 
pseudo-anonymization, since it facilitate the linkage of events for each participant across 




multiple datasets and linked to form one relevant dataset for each research question.  All 
variables remained intact and no new variables were constructed by triangulation of multiple 
variables.  This was because data collection procedures could not be confirmed as being 
identical. 
 
Content: data quality and data coverage 
The quality of data varied both within and between datasets.  Of the 830 data fields, none 
were fully-completed, including those identified as “mandatory” by host agencies.  Data field 
completion rates were higher for social care than for health datasets, and these datasets were 
more likely to be coded appropriately for the purpose of statistical analysis.  An overview of 
the proportion of completed fields is shown in Table 2. 
 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
 
Table 2 shows that almost a fifth of the data fields (17%) were less than 10% complete.  This 
was not a result of any aspect of the linkage processes since all data fields remained intact 
throughout the study.  It should be noted that most of these data fields contained no data.  An 
additional problem was that, where null values were returned in cells, it was not always clear 
if this represented a negative response or was indeed truly “missing” data.  Furthermore, it 
was not clear where missing data were likely to be an artefact of administrative systems/lack 
of time/etc. and where they may have reflected under-represented subgroups and could skew 
findings. 
 
Data coverage was generally satisfactory.  From the perspective of undertaking health 




information was not contained within routinely-collected, nationally-held datasets.  Indeed, 
this information is not stored for psychiatric morbidity, at least, in a consistent electronic 
format.  Secondly, as discussed previously, impracticalities meant that Primary Care data 
were not included in the present study.  Finally the DWP was engaged as a partner agency 
with the aim of ascertaining financial hardship through receipt of a qualifying benefit; 
however, as described previously, these data were not forthcoming. 
 
Overview of the integrated datasets held within the HIC Safe Haven 
The complete battery of datasets totaled 27 and included 1528 cases and 6112 controls.  The 
number of events totaled over quarter of a million; however, this figure was largely 
influenced by dispensed prescription drugs and, to a lesser degree, laboratory results. 
 
Discussion 
Barriers to approvals and receipt of data extracts 
The first barrier to data access was encountered during the application stages, whereby many 
agencies were unclear about the existence of established precedents and the relevant 
personnel within their agency for handling data-sharing requests.  This resulted in substantial 
delays.  Numerous strategies were employed in assisting partner agencies through the various 
stages of the application process, based on the previous experience of the research team.  This 
included, but was not limited to, agency-wide presentations by the research team, question 
and answer sessions with partner agencies, meeting with several personnel within agencies in 
efforts to ensure that the most appropriate members of staff were identified, immediate 
responses to all queries from partner agencies to ensure continued momentum, sending 




strategies employed was to use a “top-down” approach when communicating with external 
agencies – i.e. to begin as high up the chain of command as possible. 
 
A significant barrier arose when the PBPP communicated that it would be unwilling to 
disclose individual patient identifiers for the purpose of obtaining data extracts from other 
partner agencies covering the relevant individuals.  The resolution to this barrier involved 
further negotiations with the PBPP and the use of a TTP, in this case HIC Services.  The data 
were transferred to the TTP with personal identifiers intact and all data extractions were 
undertaken by the TTP, either within their virtual environment or using the HIC-generated 
pseudo-anonymization index key.  The PBPP was satisfied with this proposal and no further 
problems were encountered around this issue.  Just prior to the initiation of the present study, 
the PBPP had replaced the former Privacy Advisory Committee (PAC) and this may have 
contributed to the substantial delay in processing our application; however, the new PBPP 
appeared to be relatively poorly informed concerning the data that could or could not be 
made available through its governance system.  Several months after having included NHS24 
in the PBPP application, the research team was informed that NHS24 data could not be made 
available through the PBPP, and that an independent ISP would be required for access to 
NHS24 data.  This lack of knowledge led to substantial delays in final receipt of the NHS24 
data extract. 
 
A further barrier was the potential financial cost in obtaining data extracts, for example, 
where non-proprietary IT systems were in place.  This was the case for the three local 
authorities; however, each subsumed the non-proprietary administrative costs associated with 
data acquisition.  The Tayside Outpatient Appointments System (TOPAS) is also managed by 




behalf of NHS Tayside.  The appropriate protocols and procedures were identified rapidly; 
however, the non-proprietary administrative costs rendered this extract cost-prohibitive.  The 
involvement of third partner agency staff raised a new set of problems: namely that these 
members of staff were accountable within their own agency and not directly accountable to 
the target agency.  The result was that, even after having received sign-off, third agency staff 
had the opportunity to block or to delay data transfer.  In some cases this was due to lack of 
prioritization; however, in the case of one Local Authority, the data transfer was blocked on 
alleged “ethical grounds”.  Through discussions, it transpired that the third agency was not 
fully aware of all safety protocols, and there were no further problems; however, this resulted 
in further delays in obtaining data extracts. 
 
Receipt of formal approval did not, however, necessarily indicate that the required data 
extract would be forthcoming, even where there was no third agency involvement.  On 
several occasions, data managers not familiar with the authority of their governance 
departments stalled on delivering extracts expecting us to begin a dialogue with them in order 
to obtain their approval, despite that not being required.  This was thought likely to be a 
function of the novelty of this study and, as more studies are undertaken using health 
informatics approaches to link data from social care and criminal justice sectors, precedents 
will become more readily established and understood.  In the meantime, however, any future 
studies should factor into protocols additional “buffer” time to counteract delays in their 
anticipated timeframes.  From the perspective of partner agencies, continued governance 
involvement and accountability could assist in efficient extract delivery. 
 
The key continuing barrier to data access concerns those held by Police Scotland.  Following 




withdraw approval due to concerns around the pseudo-anonymization procedure and, more 
specifically, that the index key would be held by an external agency (i.e. HIC Services).  
Police Scotland has a well-established precedent for data sharing in the form of anonymized 
data feeds; however, this novel approach presented a challenge.  In conclusion, Police 
Scotland would require a guarantee of full anonymization prior to considering data sharing 
using this model.  The research team has since entered into further discussions with Police 
Scotland and is now in a position to test further protocols and procedures which can 
guarantee anonymity for individuals. 
 
Barriers to data integration within the TTP Safe Haven 
As discussed previously, the potential route to a key barrier concerning data integration 
within the TP Safe Haven was that agencies holding non-CHI-indexed data were concerned 
about transferring a data feed containing all data for all individuals during the observation 
period, and the PBPP was concerned about not making individual identifiers known to these 
agencies.  As discussed, this required the use of HIC-generated pseudo-anonymization index 
keys.  No problems were encountered, however, and proof of concept was demonstrated.  The 
only issue encountered was that extraneous data were made available in the Safe Haven (i.e. 
for individuals in the study, but for dates spanning far beyond those of the observation 
period).  This issue was highlighted to HIC Services and remedied rapidly.  No other issues 
were encountered regarding data integration within the TTP Safe Haven. 
 
Barriers to data interrogation 
Data quality and coverage were the two key barriers encountered in terms of data 
interrogation.  The findings of this study show that 46% of all data fields were less than half-




identified as “mandatory” by the partner agencies were fully-completed; however, the 
completed proportion was higher for mandatory fields than for optional fields.  Non-
completion of data fields was a greater issue in the health, than in the social care, datasets.  It 
is difficult to speculate on potential solutions to this problem without further knowledge of 
the specific barriers faced by each agency in completing all data fields, or at least all 
mandatory data fields.  Health informatics-based research is viewed as a strategic priority and 
asset. In order to keep pace with developments, health and social care agencies should be 
required over time to assume accountability for maintaining data quality beyond current 
levels. 
 
Data coverage was generally good, with only a few obvious omissions; however, these 
omissions took the form of complete datasets, rather than data fields within any one dataset.  
In terms of health informatics research, perhaps the greatest issue is the lack of routinely-
collected electronic information on patient diagnostic status, particularly in relation to 
psychiatric morbidity.  The other obvious omissions were indicators of financial hardship 
(due to lack of DWP engagement) and Primary Care contacts (due to each practice acting as 
its own data gatekeeper, and the consequent high investment of resources required to engage 
GP practices as partner agencies).  The future of health informatics depends on stakeholder 
engagement, established data sharing precedents, and partner agency accountability for data 
quality. 
 
Feasibility regarding the identification 12-month risk factors for suicide completion 
The feasibility of obtaining many of the required datasets was demonstrated.  Obtaining data 
from Local Authority Finance Departments and Police Scotland was not achieved; however, 




included in the present study provided a wealth of data, enabling the derivation of a number 
of statistical models identifying 12-month risk factors for suicide completion in both clinical 
and non-clinical populations.  The principal challenge to the feasibility of using routinely-
collected data held within health registers was the poor completion of some of the key data 
fields.  This necessitated the use of imputational techniques, where feasible, and resulted in 
the exclusion of some data fields that would have been included otherwise.  Data completion 
was less problematic in routinely-collected social care data provided by Local Authorities.  
The findings from the primary data analyses were presented to the Scottish Government, with 
the aim of informing suicide prevention policy and further developing clinical practice in this 
area, and work is currently underway on several manuscripts which will be submitted to peer-
reviewed journals for publication. 
 
Cost of conducting the present study 
The total cost of the study was the sum of the costs associated with using a Trusted Third 
Party, one researcher’s full-time salary for 24 months and obtaining and pseudo-anonymising 
the non-NHS data (because these datasets used different person identifiers).  The TTP took 
responsibility for hosting and pseudo-anonymising the relevant datasets.  The total cost of 
this service was circa £60,000 over the total study period.  The researcher took responsibility 
for familiarising herself with the required legislative and procedural components associated 
with obtaining these data, negotiating with the relevant partner agencies the specific data 
items to be obtained from each dataset, guiding the TTP regarding the specifics of their input, 
constructing satisfactory Information Sharing Protocols in conjunction with Local Authority, 
Police Scotland and University solicitors, co-ordinating the testing and final procedure 
associated with indexing non-NHS data, cleaning and coding data, and linking and analysing 




The external agency that indexed the non-NHS data took responsibility for implementing 
their previously-tested procedure in the Local Authority context and was engaged in 
discussions with Police Scotland concerning the implementation of a similar procedure using 
their data.  The total cost of this service was £12k.  The partner agency costs associated with 
working on this study were subsumed by these partner agencies: the Information Services 
Division of National Services Scotland, the three Local Authorities and Police Scotland. 
 
Conclusions 
With the use of a Trusted Third Party, feasibility was demonstrated for this novel model of 
electronic linkage and interrogation of large, sensitive datasets – from the disciplines of 
health, social care and criminal justice – with the aim of identifying 12-month risk factors for 
suicide or drug-related death.  Most of the barriers to data access, linkage and interrogation 
were resolved; however, they resulted in substantial delays in the study timeline, and this was 
particularly true during the approvals stage of the project.  Further studies in this area should 
be aware of the potential for substantial delays and adjust study protocols accordingly.  Data 
quality was generally poor, and many data fields held no data, even when the host agency had 
identified it as a “mandatory” data field.  Driven by policy and culture towards the increasing 
integration of health and social care commissioning and service delivery, healthcare, social 
care and criminal justice services should consider developing established data-sharing 
protocols and procedures, and also clear accountability for data quality.  Ultimately, the 
feasibility of the present study was demonstrated; however, additional time would have been 
required in order to obtain all of the desired datasets.  Poor completion of some of the key 
data fields in the health datasets was the most significant challenge in deriving statistical 




use of imputational techniques, where feasible.  However, there was a wealth of data that 
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Appendix I: ICD codes used to identify target cohorts 
Probable suicides were identified in Tayside during the period 2009-2014  Identification of 
these cases was based on the Scottish Government criteria, where cause of death is reported 
as one of the following codes from the International Classification of Diseases (ICD v10): 
o X60-64 and Y87.0 (intentional self-harm) 
o Y10-34 and Y87.2 (events of undetermined intent) 
 
Drug-related deaths were identified in Tayside during the period 2009-2014.  Identification of 
these cases was based on the Scottish Government’s “baseline” definition of drug-related 
death, where cause of death is reported as one of the following codes from the ICD v10: 
o F11 Disorders related or resulting from abuse or misuse of opioids 
o F12 Disorders related or resulting from abuse or misuse of cannabis 
o F13 Disorders related or resulting from abuse of misuse of sedatives or hypnotics 
o F14 Disorders related or resulting from abuse or misuse of cocaine 
o F15 Disorders related or resulting from abuse or misuse of other stimulants 
o F16 Disorders related or resulting from abuse or misuse of hallucinogens 
o F19 Disorders related or resulting from abuse or misuse of other psychoactive 
substances 
o X40-X441 Accidental poisoning 
o X60-X61 Intentional self-poisoning by drugs, medicaments and biological 
substances 
o X851 Assault by drugs, medicaments and biological substances 
o Y10-Y141 Event of undetermined intent, poisoning 
 
1 In the presence of at least one of the following T-Codes: 
o T40 Poisoning by, adverse effect of and underdosing of narcotics and 
psychodysleptics [hallucinogens] 
o T41 Poisoning by, adverse effect of and underdosing of anesthetics and 
therapeutic gases 
o T42 Poisoning by, adverse effect of and underdosing of antiepileptic, sedative, 
hypnotic and antiparkinsonism drugs 






In order to ensure that all appropriate cases were included in each of the target cohorts, we 
triangulated data from different sources to construct the cohorts. 
(1) Cohort 1 – “probable suicide”: Identified through a combination of all cases in the 
ScotSID dataset, plus appropriate ICD 10 codes in the NRS death dataset. 
(2) Cohort 2 – “probable drug death”: Identified through a combination of all cases in the 
NDRD dataset, plus all cases in the locally held Tayside DRD dataset, plus appropriate ICD 
10 codes in the NRS Death dataset.  
(3) Other deaths related to “high risk behaviors”: Identified through appropriate ICD 10 






Table 1: requirement for specific approvals in order to obtain the required data extracts 
Required approvals Datasets 
Public Benefit and Privacy Panel for 
Health and Social Care (PBPP) 
Scottish Suicide Information Database 
National Drug-Related Death Database 
Scottish Ambulance Service 
NHS24 
Information Sharing Protocols (ISPs) NHS24 
Scottish Ambulance Service 
Tayside Outpatient Appointments System 
Police Scotland 
Tayside Drug Related Death Database 
Local Authority Social Work Department data 
(Angus, Dundee and Perth & Kinross) 
Local Authority Finance Department data 
(Angus, Dundee and Perth & Kinross) 
Department of Work and Pensions 
Primary Care 
NHS Tayside Caldicott Guardian Tayside Drug Related Death Database 
Tayside Outpatient Administrative System 
(TOPAS) 
HIC-hosted Scottish Morbidity Registers (SMR00; 
SMR01; SMR02; SMR04; SMR06; and SMR25) 




(biochemistry; virology; hematology; 
immunology; and microbiology) 
Other HIC-hosted datasets (SBR; NRS Death; 
A&E; CHI Database; and Demographics). 










Table 2: Percentage of data fields completed (by percentage completion of each data field) 


























Figure 1: Timeframe for formal approval and receipt of data extracts, and status of 
application at study conclusion 
 
Figure 2: Flow of data through the study framework 
 
Figure 3: Indexing procedure used in obtaining non-CHI-indexed data: transfer methods and 
security protocols 
 
